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What Will the “Foreseeable Future” Bring for ClimateImperiled Species?
BY: OLIVIA BAUER*
ABSTRACT
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the strongest source of federal protection
for species that are at risk of extinction, and the ESA is becoming increasingly
important as climate change threatens species and their habitats more than ever. In
2019, the Trump Administration amended the ESA to provide clarity and
predictability when making decisions to list a species as threatened or endangered
under the ESA. The Administration defined “foreseeable future” in a way that starkly
limits how far into the future the listing agencies may look when assessing risks to
species. Prior to the 2019 definition of “foreseeable future,” the federal agencies in
charge of deciding to list species under the ESA faced risk uncertainty when
assessing the likelihood and magnitude of threats to species and their habitats from
climate change predominantly because of scientific uncertainty and difficulty
predicting mitigation efforts.
This Note argues that instead of the 2019 amendments providing the intended
clarity and consistency, the “foreseeable future” definition instead weakens the
substantive standards used in the ESA listing process, limits federal agencies’ ability
to consider climate change when making decisions on whether to provide species
with ESA protections, and ultimately will push climate-imperiled species further
toward the risk of extinction. To provide more effective guidance to the agencies
making listing decisions under the ESA, revised rulemaking should require the
agencies to explain how they deal with uncertainties and species’ risk of
endangerment and to apply standards consistently.
INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the flagship legislation in the United States
to prevent species extinctions. As of 2020, more than 1600 species of animals are
listed as endangered or threatened and, thus, are protected by the Act.1 Although

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., Miami
University, 2019. Special thanks to Professor Robert Fischman for his help in developing my
topic and strategy while writing this Note and for supporting me throughout my law school
career, the ILJ Associates and Executive team for their diligent work in improving this Note,
my Maurer friends who believed in me, and my family for their unending support and belief
in me.
1. See Species Directory, NOAA FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/speciesdirectory/threatened-endangered (documenting a total of 165 endangered and threatened
marine
species);
Listed
Animals,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/ad-hoc-speciesreport?kingdom=V&kingdom=I&status=E&status=T&status=EmE&status=EmT&status=E
XPE&status=EXPN&status=SAE&status=SAT&mapstatus=3&fcrithab=on&fstatus=on&fs
pecrule=on&finvpop=on&fgroup=on&header=Listed+Animals (documenting a total of 1470
listed and endangered species).
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species are still being listed, other species are recovering. More than ninety-seven
species are delisted2––meaning that the species no longer need the ESA’s protection.3
Listing species occurs through a formal rulemaking process.4 The rulemaking
process called “listing” is the gatekeeper for which species receive protections to
reverse their path toward extinction. Efforts to widen the “gate” expand the number
of species protected under the Act and increase the range of activities and actions
subject to the statute. Conversely, steps to limit listing may be seen as reducing ESA
regulation. The ESA considers a species “in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range” as endangered.5 Species “likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future” are listed as threatened.6 Both of
these statutory thresholds for ESA protection require predictions. Climate change has
emerged as an important threat to species survival and a confounding factor in
predicting the risk of extinction. In particular, federal agencies and courts have
struggled with defining the scope of “foreseeable future” in deciding whether to
protect a species as threatened.
In deciding whether a particular species is likely to become endangered in the
“foreseeable future,” the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) face uncertainties. Threatened listings under the ESA
involve risk uncertainty because assessing risks requires the Services to look at both
the magnitude and likelihood of threats.7 Likelihoods of climate change threats are
difficult to predict because what mitigation efforts will be taken and how species will
respond to threats are unclear.8 Climate change models used to predict future threats
involve speculations and uncertainties, which also pertain to uncertain magnitude
projections.9 Additionally, inconsistency results from agencies proceeding under
ambiguous terms or standards.
Agencies have great discretion in interpreting “foreseeable future” when
assessing risks, especially because “foreseeable future” was never defined in a rule
prior to 2019. In 2009, the Solicitor for the United States Department of Interior’s
opinion (“M-Opinion”) provided the Services with the guidance that “foreseeable
future” should be defined on a situational basis and will depend on the data available
during listing determinations.10 Even with the M-Opinion’s guidance, the Services

2. See
Delisted
Species,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/species-delisted.
3. Delisting Species Under the Endangered Species Act, NOAA FISHERIES,
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/endangered-species-conservation/delisting-speciesunder-endangered-species-act
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533; 5 U.S.C. § 553.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). The list of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife can be found at
50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2020).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (emphasis added).
7. See id.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. Solicitor's Memorandum on the Meaning of ‘Foreseeable Future’ in Section 3(20) of
the ESA, M–37021 (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/M37021%20Foreseeable%20future.pdf [hereinafter M-Opinion]; see also infra text
accompanying notes 79–81.
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still faced difficulties posed by uncertainties based on scientific projections,
mitigation efforts, and predictions of species’ responses.11 To achieve the ESA’s
goals of conserving threatened and endangered species and using all possible
methods necessary to recover them,12 courts sometimes provide more deference to
affirmative listing decisions than decisions not to list species.13
Though the ESA itself contains substantive and procedural requirements for the
process of listing species for protection under the ESA, there remain many
implementation details that the Services have discretion to determine via regulation.
Since many of the Services’ rulemakings and courts’ decisions used the M-Opinion
as the baseline for interpreting “foreseeable future,” FWS essentially used the 2019
ESA amendments (“2019 rule”) to codify the M-Opinion and what the Services and
courts were already doing.14 In an effort to provide clarity and improve predictability
of species listings,15 FWS defined “foreseeable future” as extending “only so far into
the future as the Services can reasonably determine that both the future threats and
the species’ responses to those threats are likely,”16 requiring consideration of the
likelihood of endangerment and how long this risk extends into the future on a caseby-case basis.17
Despite the goals to provide clarity and avoid speculation too far into the future,18
the 2019 “foreseeable future” definition falls short in a few areas. First, the 2019
definition does not provide enough clarity. Although FWS codified a definition for
the first time and defined terms such as “likely” similarly to other entities,19 there are
still vague and potentially ambiguous standards to guide the Services’ listing
decisions. Along the same lines, the Services’ listing determinations are often
criticized and are given less discretion by courts when a Service fails to adequately

11. See infra Part II.
12. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (“The purposes of
the bill included the conservation of the species and of the ecosystems upon which they
depend, and every agency of government is committed to see that those purposes are carried
out.”).
13. Compare Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 2016)
(agreeing with NMFS’s affirmative listings and its contention that agencies need not predict a
population reduction, define an extinction threshold, nor establish the probability of reaching
the threshold) with Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 488 F. Supp.
3d 1219, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (rejecting FWS’s decision not to list the Florida Keys mole
skink because of FWS’s inadequate justification based on scientific uncertainty, especially
“when the future of a species is on the line”).
14. See 50 C.F.R. § 424 (2019).
15. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species
and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45020, 45020–01 (proposed Aug. 27, 2019)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424 (2019)).
16. § 424.11(d).
17. Id.
18. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. at 45027.
19. Id. at 45021 (defining likely as “more likely than not”). This definition is similar to
IPCC’s definition of likely—greater than or equal to sixty-six percent. MICHAEL D.
MASTRANDREA ET AL., GUIDANCE NOTE FOR LEAD AUTHORS OF THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT ON CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES 3 (2010), https://www.ipcc.ch/
site/assets/uploads/2017/08/AR5_Uncertainty_Guidance_Note.pdf.
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explain a decision not to list a species as endangered,20 and these occurrences will
likely continue when unclear and inconsistent standards are offered as guidance.
Second, the 2019 rule does not adequately address one of the most severe and
impending threats to species—climate change. The definition’s limitation to only
“likely” threats and species’ responses will inhibit the Services’ abilities to consider
long-range climate change projections when analyzing threats—like extreme heat,
drought, and rising sea levels—facing species, even though these threats are
becoming increasingly frequent and problematic to the survival of species.21 To
mitigate these problems, the Services must focus on consistency and clarity in future
rulemaking and guidance.
This Note focuses on the 2019 rule’s definition of “foreseeable future.” Part I
explains the purpose of the ESA and details how the listing process works. Using
caselaw, Part II explains the issues the Services and courts face when interpreting the
meaning of “foreseeable future” prior to the 2019 definition and examines challenges
that climate change presents to assessing the risk of extinction. Part III details what
the 2019 rule involves—specifically focusing on the addition of a “foreseeable
future” definition—and analyzes shortcomings of the definition. Part IV concludes
by predicting the likely fate of the new rule in judicial challenges in the face of
uncertainties and suggests ways the Services could better fulfill their objectives
moving forward through rulemaking.
I. THE ESA’S PURPOSE AND THE LISTING PROCESS
In 1973, Congress enacted the ESA to protect and recover imperiled species and
their habitats worldwide.22 From the start, Congress announced its goal of enacting
the ESA to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved . . . [and] provide a program
for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”23 This
purpose is to be achieved at whatever cost.24 The ESA defines “conserve,”
“conserving,” and “conservation” to mean “to use and the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary.”25

20. See infra Part II; Otter v. Salazar, No. 1:11-CV-00358-CWD, 2012 WL 3257843 (D.
Idaho Aug. 8, 2012) (vacating the species’ listing after FWS failed to provide an adequate
justification for its interpretation of “foreseeable future”).
21. See infra Section II.A.
22. Endangered
Species
Act,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/international/laws-treaties-agreements/us-conservationlaws/endangered-species-act.html.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
24. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (“Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all
activities associated with scientific resources management such as research, census, law
enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and
transplantation, and, in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.”).
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The lead federal agencies that implement the ESA are the FWS and NMFS, a
smaller agency within the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Fisheries Service (NOAA).26 Together, they are known as “the Services.”
Specifically, the Secretary of the Interior for FWS and the Secretary of Commerce
for NMFS have the responsibility to administer the ESA.27 As part of the method to
achieve the conservation and recovery of species, these agencies have the power to
determine which species are in need of greatest federal protection (listing)28 and
when those species are recovered to the point at which they no longer need protection
under the Act (delisting).29
The Services initiate listing via two alternative routes: (1) NMFS or FWS initiate
a status review of the species or (2) more commonly, concerned citizens use petitions
to invite the listing Services to review the status of species.30 The ESA authorizes
interested people to petition the appropriate agencies for the listing of any species.31
Nongovernmental organizations, scientific societies, and community groups play a
key role in species conservation by introducing these petitions.32 Requests for species
to be considered for listing under the ESA require information on the species’ current
population trends, factors that may cause species to be threatened or endangered, and
effectiveness of existing state conservation efforts.33 Within ninety days of receipt,
the Services must publish specific findings about the petition in the Federal Registrar
conveying whether there is “substantial information” meriting listing.34 Within a
year, the Services decide whether the listing of the species is warranted or not.35
Under section four of the ESA, the Services are required to list species of animals
and plants as threatened or endangered.36 The substantive standards for listing are
based on an evaluation of the risks a species faces: present or threatened habitat
modification, overutilization, predation, disease, inadequacy of existing regulatory
measures, and other factors.37 The degree of threat, which involves consideration of
the magnitude and probability of threats, is the most important consideration for the
listing agencies.38 Next, species’ life histories are considered to discover the
adequacy of their responses to threats, and this may require generations of data to

26. See Implementation of ESA and Related Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/endangered-species-act.
27. See id.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
29. Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/listing-overview.html; see § 1533(a)(2)(B).
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); CTR. FOR SCI. & DEMOCRACY, ADVANCING SCIENCE IN THE
ENDANGERED
SPECIES
ACT
4
(2017),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/07/esa-toolkit-ucs-july-2017.pdf.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
32. CTR. FOR SCI. & DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 7.
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3); CTR. FOR SCI. & DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 9.
34. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
35. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
36. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
37. § 1533(a)(1); Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview, supra note 29.
38. Listing a Species as a Threatened or Endangered Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/listing.pdf.
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discover.39 The Services then assess if there are any known factors that will affect
the conservation of species in the “foreseeable future” and correlate these threats
from the life history over the period in which each threat is foreseeable, which
includes assessing how threats will affect species at different life stages and
generations.40 The ultimate objective of this analysis is to figure out whether species’
populations are likely to be maintained at a level that does not threaten or endanger
their existence in the “foreseeable future.”41
The analysis results in a listing decision, which has three possible outcomes: no
listing rule, an endangered listing rule, or a threatened listing rule.42 Endangered
species are those “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range.”43 After facing criticism for the inadequacy of legal protections for species
on the verge of extinction, Congress extended the ESA protections44 to “threatened
species,” which are those species “likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”45 Essentially,
the difference between an endangered and threatened species is “the timing of when
a species may be in danger of extinction.”46 The Services must base these decisions
solely on the best available scientific and commercial data,47 but public opinions from
the commenting process on the Federal Registrar posting also play a role.48
These agencies follow Administrative Procedure Act (APA) informal rulemaking
when making listing decisions.49 But the ESA overlays additional procedures. The
listing Service must publish notices of review that they believe a species is threatened
or endangered, seek biological information to complete the review, and publish the
proposed regulation in the Federal Register.50 Within one year of this publication,
the Secretary must make a final decision as to whether the species will be listed as
endangered, threatened, or not listed at all.51 If need be, consultation with affected

39. Id.
40. Id.; see 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (2019); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B)(ii).
41. M-Opinion, supra note 10, at 6.
42. See § 1533(a).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). The list of Endangered and Threatened wildlife can be found at
50 C.F.R. § 17.11.
44. S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 3 (1973) (quoting President Nixon, who critiqued the current
laws for not allowing enough conservation action).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
46. Endangered and Threatened Species; Identification of 14 Distinct Population
Segments of the Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) and Revision of Species-Wide
Listing, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,260, 62,261 (Sept. 8, 2016).
47. See § 1533(b)(1)(A).
48. Natalie Jacewicz, Note, Protecting Evolutionary Potential: Can the Endangered
Species Act Save Species Before They Exist?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 472, 477 (2019).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 60–63.
50. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b); Listing a Species as a Threatened or Endangered Species,
supra note 38. A full list of the “candidate species” can be found at
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/ reports/candidate-species-report.
51. § 1533(b)(6)(A). A six-month extension is available if “there is substantial
disagreement regarding the sufficiency or accuracy of the available data relevant to the
determination . . . concerned.” § 1533(b)(6)(B)(i).
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states is also encouraged in making a listing decision.52 It is incompatible with the
purpose of the ESA for agencies to defer listing a species as threatened with just a
hope that the species’ conditions will improve because this listing goes beyond just
memorializing a species on the extinction path. Listing and the ESA compel
necessary changes to save these species.53
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ISSUES ARISING FROM THE INTERPRETATION OF
“FORESEEABLE FUTURE”
In this Part, I discuss how “foreseeable future” was interpreted before the 2019
revisions. Section A provides common law and administrative background on
construing “foreseeable future.” The remaining sections in this Part use caselaw to
describe the difficulties agencies and courts faced in understanding and applying
“foreseeable future” when deciding whether or not to list species under the ESA.
Section B examines caselaw where scientific uncertainties made listing decisions
difficult. Section C details caselaw where separate mitigation efforts affected
agencies’ and courts’ decisions when interpreting “foreseeable future.” Section D
focuses on cases especially applicable to concerns today about how climate change
has and will affect decisions to or not to list species.
A. Inconsistent Foresight: Background and Administrative Issues Regarding
“Foreseeable Future”
Prior to the 2019 revisions, issues arose from interpreting the meaning of
“foreseeable future” without a set definition. The meaning of “foreseeable future” is
vital to the determination and listing of threatened species.54 Using this phrase within
the definition of a “threatened” species highlights how Congress recognized the
importance of the foreseeable future in assessing risks. This stemmed from the
importance of the “foreseeable future” in analyzing risks in common law. When
considering whether actions are too remote or proximately caused specific results,
courts base decisions upon the concept of foreseeability.55 Congress, the Services,
and courts cannot ignore the meaning and use of “foreseeable future” in common
law. However, the meaning of “foreseeable future” in common law should not be the
only source decision-makers use when assessing risks to species. The plain meaning,
legislative history, and the connotations of the phrase given by the listing process
also guide interpretation of “foreseeable future.”
Despite the importance and weight of foreseeability in common law, the language
of the ESA and the listing process discussed in Part I highlight that the “foreseeable
future” language was drafted with the intent to provide some leeway in identifying

52. See § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii).
53. See Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D.C. Or. 1998).
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
55. See Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles”, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1,
9 (2007). The proximate causation requirement of foreseeability involves looking at the
foreseeability of harm and the foreseeability of the extent of the harm. Id. at 10.
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the meaning of the phrase in different circumstances.56 Courts have refused
challengers’ attempts to establish a bright-line rule for defining “foreseeable
future.”57 Ultimately, the meaning of “foreseeable future” has been left up to the
courts’ and the Services’ discretion.58 If Congress has not directly spoken on the issue
in a statute, courts presume that Congress left the resolution to the agency’s
deference.59
Additionally, the APA provides the judiciary with an important role in policing
agency discretion. A court may hold unlawful and overturn an agency’s decision if
it is “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”60 This
arbitrary and capricious standard of review requires courts to provide a great amount
of deference to the agency, such that the court cannot substitute its judgement for the
agency’s.61 Although deference is at its highest when reviewing conclusions that rely
on technical expertise, courts must still ensure that the agency made reasonable
decisions using sound judgment.62 Agencies’ actions are considered arbitrary and
capricious when the agency (1) relied on factors not intended by Congress, (2)
entirely failed to address an important aspect of the issue, (3) offered explanations
running counter to the evidence that the agency has, or (4) offers an explanation that
is implausible enough that it couldn’t be ascribed to the product of the agency’s
expertise.63 The APA is the default standard of review for the ESA.64 Courts assess
whether the listing Services’ decisions interpreting “foreseeable future” were
arbitrary and capricious. In doing so, however, both the listing Services and courts
face issues and discrepancies regarding the interpretation of “foreseeable future.”
For common law and listing decisions, foreseeability usually involves
uncertainty, especially when predicting the future of what happens in complex
systems like ecosystems. For example, assessing long-term survival is important but
difficult “under variable and unpredictable future climate conditions.”65Among the
threats the ESA authorizes the Services to consider are present or threatened habitat
modification, overutilization, predation, disease, and inadequacy of existing
regulatory measures.66 In comparison to these identifiable problems, climate change
brings impacts to species conservation that are harder to target and measure because
scientists and agencies must deal with scientific models––which are themselves

56. See M-Opinion, supra note 10, at 13; supra Part I.
57. See W. Watersheds Project v. Foss, No. CV 04-168-MHW, 2005 WL 2002473, at *16
(refusing to “establish a bright-line rule for defining foreseeable future”).
58. Jacewicz, supra note 48, at 481.
59. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
60. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
61. See Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Elizabeth Kuhn,
Science and Deference: The “Best Available Science” Mandate is a Fiction in the Ninth
Circuit, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016).
62. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377–78; Kuhn, supra note 61.
63. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
64. Kuhn, supra note 61.
65. Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1156 (D.C. Or. 1998) (quoting
62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24, 607).
66. See Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the
Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 16 (1996).
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dependent on guessing mitigation efforts, how the earth systems are going to respond
to those changes, and how species will respond to those changes.
Climate change poses fundamental threats to species conservation and survival;
however, climate change is not mentioned in the ESA.67 Climate change leaves more
than twenty to thirty percent of species at an increased risk of extinction in the
future,68 so the problems it poses are important to consider in listing decisions.
Models projecting long-term weather patterns predict these problems will only
continue.69 When assessing species’ statuses and making listing decisions, the
Services are required to use the “best scientific and commercial data available.”70
Difficulties in measuring the threat of climate change make quantifying its impact
especially difficult. These uncertainties about the future of climate change include
(1) incomplete understandings of atmospheric, geographic, and oceanic processes;
(2) future human decisions about the path of future greenhouse gas emissions (GHG);
(3) impacts that climate change will have on species’ habitats; and (4) species’
responses to those changes.71
The prime illustration of climate change’s impact on species conservation through
the ESA is exemplified by the polar bear. In 2005, the Center for Biological Diversity
recognized the threat facing polar bears’ habitat because of climate change and
petitioned FWS to list the polar bear as threatened under the ESA.72 After review,
FWS published a proposed rule to list the polar bear as threatened and justified this
decision with findings about the polar bear’s taxonomy, evolution, and population.73
FWS cited three overarching reasons justifying the polar bear’s listing as threatened:
(1) the polar bear depends on sea ice for survival; (2) sea ice is declining; and (3)
climate change will continue to reduce the extent and quality of sea ice.74 In making
this decision, FWS used widely accepted climate models. These models exemplified
similar warming and sea ice trends until 2500; however, they diverged beyond this
year because of uncertainties involving population increases, technological
improvements, and regulatory changes.75
Despite the discrepancies beyond the mid-century projections, the D.C. District
Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.76 The case of the polar bear—
as shown by concerned citizens petitioning for the listing, FWS finding sufficient

67. Eric V. Hull, Protecting Endangered Species in an Era of Climate Change:
The Need for a Smarter Land Use Ethic, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (2015).
68. Id.
69. Andrew J. N. D. Coffey, Feeling the Heat: The Endangered Species Act and Climate
Change, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 437, 438 (2020). Changes in temperatures, precipitation
patterns, droughts, and sea levels are projected to continue through this century and beyond.
See The Effects of Climate Change, NASA GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
71. See Coffey, supra note 69, at 438.
72. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus)
Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,235 (May 15, 2008); In re Polar Bear
Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
73. In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 4–5.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 16.
76. See id. at 1, 16.
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evidence of the species likely endangerment, and the court’s decision to uphold the
threatened listing—highlights the vulnerability of species conservation in the face of
climate change and how the listing Services have considered climate change threats
under their ESA authority. When analyzing the fate of species in the “foreseeable
future” to make listing decisions like FWS did with the polar bear—which
increasingly brings into play the consideration of climate change effects—the
Services have been inconsistent.77
In 2009, the Solicitor for the United States Department of Interior wrote the MOpinion, asking the FWS to provide guidance on how the Services should interpret
“foreseeable future.”78 The Solicitor expressed that Congress intended for
“foreseeable future” to extend as far as agencies can reasonably rely on predictions,
allowing the Services to provide what is necessary for species conservation. This
reliance can vary significantly based on what kind of data is available during listing
determinations.79 The M-Opinion also highlighted that incorporation of public
participation with the law, along with use of scientific judgment, ensures that the
agencies will use their discretion wisely.80
The M-Opinion indicated that Congress intended the listing process to provide
the Services with more discretion to strategize and forecast conservation concerns in
the future.81 The views expressed by the Solicitor were incorporated into some
courts’ and agencies’ justifications for their applications of “foreseeable future” in
listing determinations.82 However, even incorporating these views into listing
decisions, in the absence of a set “foreseeable future” definition, has led to
difficulties—based on science, mitigation efforts, and species’ response predictions.
B. Difficulties Presented by Scientific Uncertainty
Agency science plays a big role in ESA decision making, specifically because
listing determinations are based on “the best scientific and commercial data
available.”83 Although Congress has not defined what “best available science”
means,84 this requirement is viewed as a congressional attempt to remove political
and commercial influences from decision making.85 The Services sometimes face
uncertainty resulting from their scientific data’s projections of magnitude and

77. See infra Section III.B.
78. M-Opinion, supra note 10, at 1.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 4.
81. See id. at 3.
82. E.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2016); Final
Listing Rule: Threatened Status for the Beringia & Okhotsk Distinct Population Segments of
the Erignathus barbatus nauticus Subspecies of the Bearded Seal, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,740, 76,740
(Dec. 28, 2012); see infra Part III.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A); Katherine Renshaw, Leaving the Fox to Guard the
Henhouse: Bringing Accountability to Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act, 32
COLUM J. ENVTL. L. 161, 166 (2007).
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
85. Renshaw, supra note 83, at 167.
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likelihood; courts often recognize this and defer to the resulting definition or lack of
a definition of “foreseeable future.”86
FWS faced scientific uncertainty regarding magnitude and likelihood of sea level
rise when determining that the Florida Keys mole skink population was neither
endangered or threatened.87 The court concluded that FWS’s listing decision was
inadequately explained, which is unacceptable “when the future of a species is on the
line.”88 FWS limited its “foreseeable future” timeline to a thirty- to forty-year limit
(until 2060), even though sea level rise projections extended until 2100, because they
feared too much uncertainty about sea level rise threats beyond 2060.89 The Services
can appropriately consider divergence among scientific models when discerning the
meaning of “foreseeable future,” and because divergence reasonably leads to
projections further in the future than agencies may consider, the court accepted
FWS’s “foreseeable future” timeline.90
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubcheno, the court recognized that the
length of time constituting “foreseeable future” varies depending on individual
species and individual threats they face; these differences are exemplified by
scientific data.91 FWS used 100 years of climate science and sea ice scenarios when
deciding that the emperor penguin’s habitat requirements would be met within that
time frame.92 Despite the use of the 100-year time frame, FWS still recognized that
using large-scale, generalized predictive models when predicting the “foreseeable
future” of species involves uncertainties about magnitude and likelihood of risks and
species responses to them.93 Similarly, based on two models—one hundred and three
hundred years—FWS found the likelihood of endangerment for killer and beluga
whales would increase, justifying their endangered listing.94 Both time frames were
considered because of the different threats facing the species.95
Courts have also accepted the inconsistent exercise of discretion without an
established “foreseeable future” definition in the absence of sufficient scientific
evidence. Western Watersheds Project v. Ashe upheld the Service’s decision not to
list the pygmy rabbit because FWS lacked sufficient and necessary data to assess the
likelihood of the risk, evaluate the rabbit’s response, and, thus, define “foreseeable

86. Id. at 172.
87. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1219,
1222–23 (S.D. Fla. 2020). The mole skink is a small, thin lizard with a long red or orange tail.
Mole Skink (Eumeces [Plestiodon] egregius), SAVANNAH RIVER ECOLOGY LABORATORY,
https://srelherp.uga.edu/lizards/eumegr.htm.
88. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 488 F. Supp. at 1233.
89. See id. at 1226.
90. Id. However, the listing decision was ultimately vacated and remanded to FWS
because FWS’s reliance on habitat loss projections was unexplainable. Id. at 1233.
91. 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
92. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12–Month Finding on a Petition
to List Four Penguin Species as Threatened or Endangered Under the Endangered Species Act
and Proposed Rule to List the Southern Rockhopper Penguin in the Campbell Plateau Portion
of Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,264 (Dec. 18, 2008).
93. See Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
94. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Endangered Status for Southern
Resident Killer Whales, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,903 (Nov. 18, 2005).
95. See Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
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future.”96 Beyond using the best available scientific data, the ESA does not require
agencies to conduct their own studies to make a listing determination, but it is
important for agencies to consider trends that are normally assessed regarding the
species’ distribution, abundance, and habitat.97 This kind of data was unavailable for
the Agency in Ashe, so the court decided that the Agency could not adequately define
“foreseeable future.”98
Courts allowed the Services to use longer-term projections to define “foreseeable
future.” For example, after performing a rulemaking process, NMFS concluded that
two distinct population segments of the Pacific bearded seal subspecies were
threatened with endangerment in the “foreseeable future.”99 NMFS reasonably
concluded that shrinking sea loss would cause habitat loss for the seal populations,
“almost certainly” threatening their survival.100 Despite NMFS’s previous practice
of setting the year 2050 as the extent of “foreseeable future,” the court accepted
NMFS’s new policy.101 This policy used longer-term climate projections and more
consideration for the specific habitat and threat factors in this case.102 This reflects
the approach taken in the M-Opinion.103 Additionally, the court affirmed that
agencies need not quantitatively demonstrate the magnitude of threats facing a
species—agreeing with NMFS that agencies need not predict a population reduction,
define an extinction threshold, nor establish the likelihood of reaching the
threshold.104

96. 948 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180, 1184 (D. Idaho 2013); see Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List the Pygmy Rabbit as Endangered
or Threatened, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,516, 60516–61.
97. Ashe, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
98. Id. at 1182. Similarly, NOAA’s listing of the Mexico-distinct population of humpback
whales as threatened has yet to be challenged. In this case, NOAA considered “foreseeable
future” to mean “the horizon over which predictions about conservation status of the species
can be reasonably relied upon.” Endangered and Threatened Species; Identification of 14
Distinct Population Segments of the Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) and
Revision of Species-Wide Listing, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,260, 62,261 (Sept. 8, 2016). NOAA
considered the species’ history, habitat characteristics, data, predictability of particular threats,
and the reliability of forecasting these threats to be within the meaning of “foreseeable future.”
See id. No time horizon was provided for what “foreseeable future” meant in this case. NOAA
reasoned that narrowing down “foreseeable future” to a set number is inappropriate when
making listing decisions because threats can be measured by different available data and
threats operate across different time measures. See id.
99. Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016); see Final Listing
Rule: Threatened Status for the Beringia & Okhotsk Distinct Population Segments of the
Erignathus barbatus nauticus Subspecies of the Bearded Seal, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,740, 76,740
(Dec. 28, 2012).
100. Pritzker, 840 F.3d at 681, 682.
101. An agency need not show that a new policy is better than an older policy. To justify
the adoption of a new policy, an agency must just acknowledge its changing position and
provide new findings that justify the change. Id. at 682; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
102. See Pritzker, 840 F.3d at 681–82.
103. Id. at 681.
104. Id. at 684.
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Some agencies refused to set a timeline for the “foreseeable future” because of
difficulties predicting the response of species, even with the guidance of the MOpinion.105 The court in Otter v. Salazar vacated the slickspot peppergrass’s listing
after FWS failed to provide a definition or justification for its interpretation of
“foreseeable future.”106 FWS defined this period as “that period of time over which
events can reasonably be anticipated,” which stems from the court’s analysis in
Western Watersheds Project v. Foss.107 However, the court in Otter clarified that
Foss did not endorse this specific definition for the ESA, as it varies depending on
the particular species.108 Foss and a federal regulation, which used the life cycle of
an ecosystem to estimate that “foreseeable future” falls between thirty to one hundred
years,109 provided FWS with sufficient guidance to define “foreseeable future.”110
The definition FWS offered in this case does not amount to what the ESA requires;
it is not supported by the species-specific requirement, as focused on in the MOpinion,111 and is too generic on its face for the court to accept without the fear of
this same definition being applied to any species.112 The court agreed with the
Plaintiff’s arguments that “the failure to provide an adequate definition of
foreseeable future undermines the entire listing” and that “without a properly
calibrated definition of foreseeable future . . . [the] concern that [a] species will be
perpetually listed is well-founded.”113
The court in Center for Biological Diversity v. Everson found FWS’s
determination that the northern long-eared bat was threatened to be arbitrary and
capricious.114 FWS decided to list the bat as threatened because the spread of whitenose syndrome (WNS) and its impact on the bat were reasonably foreseeable,
indicating that the species would likely become endangered within the “foreseeable
future,” which the Service failed to set a time frame for.115 The court agreed that
FWS must look both to the likelihood and magnitude of threats and impacts on the
species.116 In making this listing determination, FWS explained there was a lack of
evidence showing that natural or manmade factors beyond WNS would significantly
affect the bat population when these factors were considered alone.117 However, the

105. Jacewicz, supra note 48, at 483.
106. No. 1:11-CV-00358-CWD, 2012 WL 3257843, at *20 (D. Idaho Aug. 8, 2012). The
slickspot peppergrass is a small, rare plant that grows only in sagebrush habitats, mostly in
southwest Idaho. Slickspot Peppergrass, IDAHO FISH & WILDLIFE OFF.,
https://www.fws.gov/idaho/promo.cfm?id=177175828.
107. Otter, 2012 WL 3257843, at *18 (citing W. Watersheds Project v. Foss, No. CV 04168-MHW, 2005 WL 2002473 (D. Idaho Aug. 19, 2005)); see Section II.B.
108. Otter, 2012 WL 3257843, at *19.
109. See 70 Fed. Reg. 2281 (Jan. 12, 2005).
110. Otter, 2012 WL 3257843, at *19.
111. See M-Opinion, supra note 10, at 9.
112. Otter, 2012 WL 3257843, at *19.
113. Id. at *20.
114. 435 F. Supp. 3d 69, 79 (D.D.C. 2020).
115. Id. at 77.
116. Id. at 86.
117. Id. at 82.
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court viewed this as FWS disregarding the cumulative effects that factors other than
WNS may have on the bat.118
C. Difficulty Predicting Mitigation Efforts
One of the factors the ESA sets out for listing determinations is the adequacy of
existing regulatory mechanisms. If a regulating entity can improve its mechanisms,
it may stave off listing. Alternatively, private stakeholders may commit to habitat
conservation119 or other conservation methods that will remove foreseeable threats
to species. NMFS and FWS sometimes consider existing or proposed mitigation
methods when making listing decisions; however, courts usually refuse to uphold
these listing decisions. For example, the court held that NMFS’s decision not to list
Oregon Coast coho salmon as threatened was based on an incorrect legal standard
and was arbitrary and capricious.120 NMFS only justified this decision because of a
lack of threat “in the interval between”—instead of in the “foreseeable future” of—
the listing decision and adopting habitat measures.121 Although not listed in its final
rule, NMFS conceded that “foreseeable future” in this case would be thirty years;
however, the court found this distinction unnecessary because only a two-year period
was used in the listing decision (the time of listing until the adoption of mitigation
measures), which is too short of a period to call the “foreseeable future.”122 This
determination only involved a “mere prospect” of endangerment rather than a
likelihood, as the ESA requires.123 In addition to this short interval, the court also
found NMFS’s focus on the State of Oregon’s potential mitigation measures
problematic because NMFS essentially deferred the decision to list the species for
two years, hoping that the State of Oregon would take some action to protect the
species.124 Without waiting to see whether state action would defend the species from
endangerment, NMFS should have simply said whether the species was likely to
become endangered in the “foreseeable future” or not.125 The court found that
NMFS’s actions indicated concern for the salmon in the future but also an
unwillingness to make a listing decision required by the ESA.126
Similarly, in Foss, FWS found that the slickspot peppergrass faced a sixty-four
percent chance of extinction within the next one hundred years with complete
implementation of conservation efforts per a candidate conservation agreement and
other resource management plans.127 FWS believed the likelihood of endangerment
fell outside the range of “foreseeable future,” suggesting that a reasonable person
would expect the extinction of the candidate species would be complete within one

118. Id.
119. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
120. Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1160–61 (D. Or. 1998).
121. Id. at 1151.
122. See id. at 1151.
123. Id. at 1152.
124. Id. at 1152.
125. See id. Then the court could review the administrative record to see if it rationally
supported NMFS’s listing decision. Id.
126. Id.
127. 2005 WL 2002473, at *1, *14 (D. Idaho 2005).
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hundred years.128 FWS’s quantification of “foreseeable future” contradicted that of
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)129: a species should
be listed as threatened under the ESA if there is a ten percent extinction risk within
one hundred years.130 The court found the Service’s conclusion to be “untenable”
and defying common sense, using Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law’s
definition of foreseeable—“such as reasonably can or should be anticipated: such
that a person of ordinary prudence would expect it to occur or exist under the
circumstances.”131 The court feared that if it just accepted the way FWS defined
“foreseeable future” in this case, without outlining any factors it used to justify its
listing decision, the Services would have free range in defining this phrase without
any guidelines.132
Similar to the court’s disapproval of NMFS delaying listing of the coho salmon
in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley because of other potential
conservation methods, the court in Foss refused to equate prolonging the inevitable
by twenty years with pushing the risk of extinction beyond what “foreseeable future”
includes.133 Despite the existing conservation efforts expressed in resource
management plans, the court concluded that FWS’s decision to remove the species
from ESA listing was arbitrary and capricious: FWS should have “erred on the side
of caution” by keeping the species listed under the ESA—especially because
scientific data indicated the likelihood of extinction within the next one hundred
years.134
D. Effects of Climate Change
Climate change presents the Services with more difficulties predicting species’
responses to different threats. This is evidenced by the polar bear.135 FWS decided
that the polar bear is likely to become endangered due to global climate change
decreasing the availability of their habitat (ice-covered seas) and should be listed as

128. Id. at *14–15. FWS experts’ reasoning placed the “foreseeable future” somewhere
between twenty and one hundred years. Id. at *17.
129. Id.; see also W. Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173,
1185 (D. Idaho 2007) (sharing the Foss court’s concern about agencies asking the court to
assume they have special insight for a listing decision that contradicts experts).
130. IUCN
Red
List
of
Threatened
Species,
IUCN,
https://www.iucn.org/resources/conservation-tools/iucn-red-list-threatened-species.
IUCN
upkeeps a list of threatened species, which uses “quantitative criteria to evaluate the extinction
risk of thousands of species.” IUCN has listed more than 32,000 species threatened with global
extinction using expert knowledge to assess the conservation status of species. Government
agencies like FWS, NOAA, and NMFS rely on these lists and the data IUCN produces to guide
their policies and regulations. Id.
131. Foss, 2005 WL 2002473, at *15.
132. Id. at *17 (conceding that the court might have accepted FWS’s conclusions if the
agency offered a detailed outline of the factors considered in its listing decision).
133. Id. (acknowledging that “foreseeable future” may be defined differently based on
circumstances).
134. Id. at *18.
135. See supra Section II.A.
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threatened.136 Since “foreseeable future” varies on a case-by-case basis, FWS
concluded that forty-five years was a fitting time period for this species.137 When
making this listing decision, FWS considered the “timeframe over which the best
available scientific data allows [it] to reliably assess the effects of threats on the
species” as the most critical component of deciding what time frame encompasses
the “foreseeable future.”138 The court concluded that FWS’s reliance on the available
climate projections, which were generally agreed upon but diverged on the basis of
risk uncertainties, adequately supported the agency’s forty-five year period for
foreseeability.139
As this Part displays, the listing Services’ interpretations of “foreseeable future”
prior to the 2019 rule revision were inconsistent, but courts afforded these
interpretations high levels of discretion. This is even the case when the Services vary
in predicting the effects of threats based on scientific data, relying on existing
mitigation efforts, and determining species’ responses. Although FWS defined
“foreseeable future” in 2019 to provide more guidance and clarity, the problems
displayed in this Part are likely to continue.
III. THE 2019 “FORESEEABLE FUTURE” DEFINITION AND ITS PITFALLS
A. The Services’ Justifications for the 2019 Revised Rule
The issues presented in Part II’s caselaw highlight the inconsistencies in how the
Services have defined “foreseeable future,” even with the help of the M-Opinion. To
bring consistency and, perhaps, also to limit the number of listings climate change
brings, in 2019, the Services suggested ways to continue improving species
protection and listing decisions by proposing and finalizing a revision to the ESA.
The Services proposed listing regulatory revisions in the Federal Register, and this
listing provided background on the proposed revisions in terms of the ESA,
legislative history, and caselaw precedent.140 After assessing public comments and
considering the issues further, this amendment became official on September 26,
2019.141 These revisions endorsed the M-Opinion’s provisions that “foreseeable

136. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May
15, 2008). FWS based this listing on three principles: polar bears depend on sea ice, the sea
ice is declining, and climate change is and will continue to reduce the amount of sea ice. In re
Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
137. In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 15; see also 12–Month Finding on a Petition to List the
Siskiyou Mountains Salamander (Plethodon stormi) and Scott Bar Salamander (Plethodon
asupak) as Threatened or Endangered, 73 Fed. Reg. 4380, 4381 (Jan. 24, 2008) (defining the
“foreseeable future” as forty years based on FWS's ability to accurately anticipate threats to
the species).
138. In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 15; see Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar
Bear, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,253.
139. In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 15–16.
140. See 50 C.F.R. § 424 (2019).
141. Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg.
45,020, 45,020 (Aug. 19, 2019).
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future” will vary by species based on the available scientific data in each instance
and that agencies have discretion to forecast conservation concerns in the future.142
The 2019 revised rule weakened the substantive standards used in the Services’
listing process. The purpose of the 2019 rule is to clarify and improve predictability
of species listings and critical habitat designations under section four of the ESA.143
To achieve this purpose, the Services enacted three amendments attempting to
eliminate automatic protections for threatened species, change standards for
designating critical habitat, and revise interagency consultation.144 First, the 2019
rule allowed the Services to use economic impacts of listing decisions.145 Essentially,
this change still required the Services to make listing decisions solely based on the
best scientific and commercial data; however, the change allowed the Services to
compile data on economic impacts to present to the public, without influencing
listing determinations.146 Second, the 2019 rule added a requirement that species’
occupied habitat must contain one of the physical or biological features essential to
conserve the species for it to be included as designated critical habitat.147
The third major revision in the 2019 rulemaking defined “foreseeable future” for
evaluating extinction risk.148 Throughout all the ESA amendments, the definition of
threatened species has not changed,149 emphasizing the importance of protecting
species that may be on the brink of extinction in the future. The Services’ initial
framework for defining “foreseeable future” in the 2019 rule received public
feedback, which focused on how the proposed framework for defining “foreseeable
future” is unclear and “impermissibly raises the bar for listing species as threatened
species.”150 The 2019 “foreseeable future” definition replaced the phrase “conditions
potentially posing a danger of extinction in the foreseeable future” with “both the
future threats and the species’ responses to those threats.”151 Public comments made
clear that the original wording could incorrectly imply that “conditions” would
include something other than “threats.”152 Additionally, the Services worried that
“posing a danger of extinction” could indicate that “foreseeable future” involves the
reasonable time in which the Services can make reasonable predictions about threats
and species’ responses to them.153 The term “likely” replaced “probably” to avoid
confusion and clarify its meaning: “more likely than not.”154

142. Id.; see M-Opinion, supra note 10, at 9.
143. See Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. at
45050.
144. See § 424.11; James Rusk & Daniel Maroon, As Legal Challenges Loom, Impact of
New Endangered Species Act Rules Remains Uncertain, 51 NO. 2 ABA TRENDS 4, 4 (2019).
145. See § 424.12.
146. See § 424.11.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See § 424.02.
150. See Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg.
45,020, 45,020 (Aug. 19, 2019).
151. See § 424.11(d).
152. See Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. at
45021.
153. Id.
154. § 424.11(d); see Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84
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After making these revisions, the Services defined “foreseeable future” as
extending “only so far into the future as the Services can reasonably determine that
both the future threats and the species’ responses to those threats are likely,”155
requiring consideration of the likelihood of extinction and how long risks extend into
the future. This consideration is to be performed on a case-by-case basis, and the
Services are not required to identify what the “foreseeable future” is in terms of a
specific time period.156 The goals of this definition were to provide clearer guidance
to the Services when interpreting the “foreseeable future” for listing decisions and
avoid speculative decisions that extend too far into the future.157
B. The 2019 “Foreseeable Future” Definition: Pitfalls
In examining how the 2019 rule falls short of the Services’ goals presented in
Section A, this Section reveals the glaring pitfalls in the “foreseeable future”
definition. Subsection 1 focuses on how the definition does not provide clarity or
consistency, and Subsection 2 argues that the definition insufficiently considers
climate-imperiled species.
1. Clarity and Consistency Concerns
Despite FWS’s goals of clarity and avoiding speculation, the 2019 “foreseeable
future” definition falls short in two areas: providing clarity and encouraging
consistency when applying standards. Although FWS defined “likely” as “more
likely than not,”158 which is similar to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s (IPCC) definition,159 this still leaves vague and potentially ambiguous
standards to guide the Services’ listing decisions. The definitions for “probable” and
“likely” mirror each other,160 leaving similar ambiguity around the meaning of
“foreseeable future” as the pre-2019 rule did rather than clarifying it.161 FWS’s
“likely” standard means that threats and species’ responses must be fifty-one percent
possible. Therefore, if the Services, using the best available science, conclude a
species has a forty-nine percent chance of endangerment, they can claim that the

Fed. Reg. at 45,021.
155. § 424.11(d).
156. Id.
157. Lisa Friedman, U.S. Significantly Weakens Endangered Species Act, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/climate/endangered-species-actchanges.html.
158. § 424.11(d); see Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84
Fed. Reg. at 45,021.
159. IPCC defined terms like “likely” and “very likely” to help interpret statistical
uncertainty and to help laypeople understand how this data and uncertainties are understood
and incorporated into the Services’ listing processes. IPCC defines “likely” as “a probability
greater than or equal to sixty-six percent.” MICHAEL D. MASTRANDREA ET AL., supra note 19,
at 3.
160. Likely, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Apparently true or real;
probable.”).
161. Coffey, supra note 69, at 448.
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species does not meet the new “likely” standard.162 This might insinuate that the best
available science is inadequate for these predictions and may continue the confusion
about what factors can be considered when determining the “foreseeable future.”163
Inconsistency results from agencies proceeding under ambiguous terms and
standards, and the definition still lacks consistency for the Services to rely on when
applying standards and justifying their “foreseeable future” quantifications.164 The
Services apply very different interpretations of “foreseeable future” to species facing
similar threats.165 For example, NMFS found that greenhouse gas and sea ice threats
affecting the Arctic ringed seal ninety years into the future were foreseeable enough
to list the species as threatened,166 whereas FWS refused to find that similar threats
posed by greenhouse gas emissions affecting the Pacific walrus less than forty-five
years away were foreseeable enough to justify listing the walrus.167 Despite the
differences, the Services did not articulate any differences in the life histories of the
species that justify the different “foreseeable future” timeframes.168 The 2019
“foreseeable future” definition does not fix these kinds of discrepancies or help the
impact of uncertain mitigation measures that might influence the speed of climate
change; however, neither will restoring the pre-2019 rule.
Along these lines, courts often criticize, reject, and provide less deference to the
Services’ listing when they fail to adequately explain a decision not to list a species
as endangered.169 To achieve the ESA’s goals of conserving threatened and
endangered species and using all possible methods necessary to recover them,170
courts sometimes provide more deference to affirmative listing decisions than
decisions not to list species.171 Treating each situation unequally, without requiring

162. Id. at 451.
163. Id. at 451–52.
164. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (2019).
165. See supra Part II.
166. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for the Arctic, Okhotsk,
and Baltic Subspecies of the Ringed Seal and Endangered Status for the Ladoga Subspecies
of the Ringed Seal, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,706 (Dec. 18, 2012).
167. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Findings on Petitions
to List 25 Species as Endangered or Threatened Species, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,618 (Oct. 5, 2017).
168. Ya-Wei Li, Species Protection Will Take More Than Rule Reversal, 370 SCIENCE 665,
665 (2020); see also supra Part II.
169. See Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D.C. Or. 1998) (holding that
NMFS’s decision not to list Oregon Coast coho salmon as threatened was arbitrary and
capricious because this determination only involved a “mere prospect” of endangerment rather
than a likelihood, as the ESA requires); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (rejecting FWS’s decision not to list the
Florida Keys mole skink because of FWS’s inadequate justification based on scientific
uncertainty, especially “when future species are on the line”); W. Watersheds Project. v. Foss,
2005 WL 2002473 (D. Idaho 2005) (rejecting FWS's determination not to list the slickspot
peppergrass because (1) FWS failed to adequately outline factors they used to justify
“foreseeable future” and their listing decisions and (2) the court feared that if they let this
decision stand, the Services would have free range in defining this phrase without any
guidelines).
170. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
171. See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 2016)
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the Services to provide more thorough explanations in every situation, will only
contribute to the inconsistency and lack of clarity for listing decisions, which Part II
exemplifies as problematic for effectively listing species that need to be listed for
survival.
2. Effect on Climate-Imperiled Species
Although climate change is expected to be the largest contributor to the loss of
species in the United States,172 the 2019 rule did not efficiently address the changing
climate conservation context that is exacerbated by climate change. Climate change
exposes more than twenty to thirty percent of species to an increased risk of
extinction.173 Climate change operates on a different paradigm than the typical ESA
mandate for the Services to prevent human disturbances of “threatened” and
“endangered” species: the causal connections between human actions and harm to
species are muddled.174 The causal chain between climate change and species’
endangerment may take multiple decades to unfold, and each species affected by
climate change will face endangerment on its own unique time frame.175
The 2019 definition of “foreseeable future” gives regulators ample room to
neglect consequences of climate change—like extreme heat, drought, and rising sea
levels—that will occur several decades from now.176 Although the Service continued
to use the best science available with the 2019 rule,177 it “avoid[ed] speculating as to
what is hypothetically possible,”178 likely impeding the Service’s ability to use
predictive climate models even if the magnitude of possible impacts is great.179
Clarity and consistency concerns are especially troubling for species imperiled by
climate change. The uncertainties posed by scientific projections, potential
mitigation efforts, and species’ responses are only more problematic in the face of
climate change. Although the 2019 rule still allowed the Services to use climate
change projections as their best available science180—these models still often rely on

(agreeing with NMFS’s affirmative listings and that agencies need not predict a population
reduction, define an extinction threshold, nor establish the probability of reaching the
threshold).
172. Lindsey Popken, How Will the 2019 Changes to the Endangered Species Act Impact
Wildlife?, SCH. OF MARINE & ENV’T AFFS. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://smea.uw.edu/currents/howwill-the-2019-changes-to-the-endangered-species-act-impact-wildlife/ (supported by the
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
(IPBES)).
173. Barry Kellman, Climate Change in the Endangered Species Act: A Jurisprudential
Enigma, 46 ENV’T. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,845, 10,845.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 10,847.
176. Id. (supported by the executive director of NYU School of Law’s State and Energy
Impact Center).
177. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (2019).
178. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35,193, 35,196 (July 25, 2018)
(emphasis added).
179. Coffey, supra note 69, at 449.
180. STEVEN P. QUARLES, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSED ESA REGULATIONS
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poor and outdated data to operate, in part because they are based on many
assumptions181—it still curtailed the Services’ reliance on long-range climate change
projections when justifying their listing determinations.182 The Services’ limitation
on constraining foreseeable analysis to only “likely” threats and responses could
allow them to move away from relying on the best available science.
IV: ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
This Part focuses on the fate of interpreting “foreseeable future.” After briefly
examining how the 2019 “foreseeable future” definition will likely fare in judicial
challenges, Section B pulls together the pitfalls discussed in Part III and how the
definition of “foreseeable future” and agencies’ guidance could improve in the
future.
Because the “foreseeable future” definition lacks clarity, set standards, and proper
consideration for climate change effects, the 2019 “foreseeable future” definition—
and 2019 rule as a whole—will “significantly weaken[] the nation’s bedrock
conservation law[,] . . . making it harder to protect wildlife from the multiple threats
posed by climate change.”183 State Attorney Generals recognized the 2019 rule’s
flaws and brought an action to challenge the decision to promulgate the rule.184
However, the fate of the 2019 “foreseeable future” definition in judicial challenges
is likely safe because the definition is likely within Chevron185 latitude and the
discretion provided to the Services. When an agency converts a Solicitor’s opinion
(like the M-Opinion) into codified rule, Chevron affords high deference to agencies’
interpretations of rules.186 However, here, the deference afforded may not change
because explaining “foreseeable future” analyses are fact-specific inquires.
A. How the Services Could Provide More Effective Guidance
Despite the linguistic change and established definition, inconsistency and
inadequate explanations still persist regarding what “foreseeable future” means.187
Although the Services have discretion under the ESA,188 they have never issued clear
guidance on how they will exercise this and do not always explain their choices.189
To better address the issues posed by the 2019 “foreseeable future” definition190 and

(2019).
181. Id.
182. James Rusk & Daniel Maroon, As Legal Challenges Loom, Impact of New
Endangered Species Act Rules Remains Uncertain, ABA TRENDS (2019).
183. Friedman, supra note 157.
184. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Bernhardt,
No.
3:19-cv-05206
(N.D.
Cal.
Aug.
21,
2019),
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/pdfs/ESA-Complaint.pdf.
185. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
186. See Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
187. See supra Section III.B.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63.
189. Li, supra note 168, at 666.
190. See supra Section III.B.

64

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT

[Vol. 97:043

provide more effective guidance, the Services should use revised rulemaking to (1)
clearly explain how they deal with uncertainties and species’ risk of endangerment
and (2) apply standards consistently.
More uniform standards governing the likelihood of extinction risks and timing
would help with the Services’ goals of clarity and transparency.191 To add more
clarity to the “foreseeable future” definition, the Services could use a quantitative
approach to define extinction risk and uncertainty of existing data in these
analyses.192 A standard similar to the IUCN standard—a species should be listed as
threatened under the ESA if there is a ten percent extinction risk within one hundred
years193—would provide a clear standard and time frame for the Services to use when
making listing decisions, leading to more consistent interpretations of “foreseeable
future.” Also, using a set date for when species’ vulnerabilities from climate change
can be assessed up until—like the IPCC’s standard for using 2100194—could also be
a good starting point for more consistency and transparency.195 However, simply
moving to a quantitative standard still leaves problems that do not necessarily fix the
clarity issue because assumptions behind the numbers used in these calculations
remain.
Although a one-size-fits-all definition or a more quantitative approach may not be
the ultimate fix for the clarity issue, the Services should be required to provide
reasons for treating each listing decision differently in terms of “foreseeable future.”
The ambiguous terms leading to inconsistent treatment of decisions whether to list
species could be addressed by providing guidance that holds the Services
accountable and requires them to explain the principles that their listing decisions are
based on. More specifically, since all forecasts of impacts to species and their
responses involve uncertainty,196 the Services should be clearer about how they deal
with uncertainties in evaluating risk of endangerment. This would likely ensure that
projections about threats and their effects are more consistent with similar situations
and encourage equally thorough explanations when deciding whether to list species
as “threatened.”
Defining “foreseeable future” more effectively can target the existing and
impending climate change threats and contribute to the promotion of climate change
adaption. Instead of going beyond the “reliance on assumption, speculation, or
preconception” that the M-Opinion wanted to avoid when interpreting the
“foreseeable future,”197 the 2019 rule should simply require that predictions be
reliable; this is all the 2009 M-Opinion presented was necessary in the face of

191. Justin Berchiolli, Note, Stewarding Species: How the Endangered Species Act Must
Improve, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1096 (2020).
192. QUARLES, supra note 180.
193. IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, supra note 13. This standard is consistent
with the ESA’s standard of threatened: “likely to become endangered in the foreseeable
future.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
194. See MATTHEW COLLINS & RETO KNUTTI, LONG-TERM CLIMATE CHANGE:
PROJECTIONS, COMMITMENTS AND IRREVERSIBILITY 1102 (2013).
195. See Li, supra note 168, at 666.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 8.
197. M-Opinion, supra note 10, at 8.
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uncertainties in the listing process.198 Like the M-Opinion that rejected the basis of
“foreseeable future” as “predictions that can be made with certainty,”199 a codified
“foreseeable future” definition should use a “reliable” or “reasonable” standard to
forecast species’ responses and threat impact; however, the Services should abjure
terms like “reliable” or “reasonable” in favor of greater quantitative estimates of both
the likelihoods of extinction risk and uncertainties. All forecasts of impacts to species
and their responses to impacts involve uncertainty, but abjuring these terms in this
way would more likely ensure that climate-imperiled species are listed—even if they
face risks whose magnitudes and likelihoods are more difficult to predict than
nonclimate imperiled species. This could mitigate deprivation of essential protection
for these species to avoid extinction, while continuing to use the best available
science as required by the ESA.200
CONCLUSION
The uncertainties posed by scientific projections, potential mitigation efforts, and
species’ responses are only becoming more problematic in the face of climate
change. ESA rulemaking should be used to cope with these difficulties. Because the
2019 rule extended “foreseeable future” “only so far into the future as the Services
can reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species’ responses to
those threats are likely,”201 the 2019 rule makes it more difficult than pre-2019
standards for regulations to factor in the decades-away impacts of climate change on
species. This limitation inhibited the Services’ abilities to consider long-range
climate change projections when analyzing threats—like extreme heat, drought, and
rising sea levels—facing species, even though these threats are becoming
increasingly frequent and problematic to the survival of species.202
Although the 2019 “foreseeable future” definition essentially codified what the
Services and courts were already doing,203 the definition fell short and limited the
risk horizon the Services analyze when deciding whether a species warrants listing.
To better address these issues and provide more effective guidance, the Services
should use revised rulemaking to (1) apply standards consistently and (2) clearly
explain how they deal with uncertainties and species’ risk of endangerment.
Consistent and clearer standards will promote public confidence in the science on
which the listings are based while also limiting political influence in listing and
conserving climate-imperiled species.
As more and more species become threatened and endangered, especially with the
increasing threats posed by climate change, it is time for the ESA to step up and go
beyond the status quo. The ESA—as a conservation law that focuses on protecting
species that are affected by climate change204—should more efficiently address the
changing conservation context that is being exacerbated by the climate change crisis.
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